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6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
tech 14ab5bb3e6 Update signed manifest to 8.6.14 2026-11-22 23:02:39 +00:00
tech 068efa0369 Update signed manifest to 8.6.13 2026-11-21 04:39:30 +00:00
tech e1db7880ab Update signed manifest to 8.6.12 2026-11-21 02:06:52 +00:00
tech 3739dce132 Update signed manifest to 8.6.11 2026-11-21 01:09:42 +00:00
tech 20de9503d2 Update signed manifest to 8.6.10 2026-11-20 23:40:36 +00:00
tech 682a78255d Update signed manifest to 8.6.9 2026-11-20 22:51:31 +00:00
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{
"version": "8.6.8",
"released_at": "2026-11-20T21:26:21+00:00",
"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v8.6.8/argus-wordpress-defence-8.6.8.zip",
"sha256": "4f0e0c89c316c8dcf0bd1dd0dee879f19e71258194add3c9bad81f37638c35e7",
"version": "8.6.14",
"released_at": "2026-11-22T23:02:39+00:00",
"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v8.6.14/argus-wordpress-defence-8.6.14.zip",
"sha256": "4bda71e1994cb4940544f797bcf5c92de6f92c0a54a1ef4a13130e1590aed414",
"min_php": "7.4",
"min_wp": "6.0",
"critical": false,
"summary": "- Security: uploaded file content is now scanned by WAF PHP injection rules (crs-933xxx, phpi-*, eval-based rules), so webshells embedded inside files with benign names (e.g. \"image.jpg\") are detected even when a plugin moves the file directly without passing through the Upload Guard.\n- Security: removed User-Agent and Referer header exclusions from all custom WAF rules covering SQL injection, remote code execution, PHP injection, path traversal, XXE, and SSRF \u2014 these attack vectors are regularly delivered through request headers.\n- Security: WAF live-corpus scan window expanded to cover values up to 64 KB without a gap \u2014 previously values over 16 KB had an unscanned middle band that could be exploited by padding an attack payload with 16 KB of harmless content.\n- Security: the WAF no longer fails open. A value that cannot be fully evaluated within its CPU budget now raises a high-severity \"evasion\" signal and is blocked for untrusted users; verified authors with the unfiltered_html capability may still save large content. Padding, repeated units and oversized values can no longer be used to slip an attack past the rules.\n- Performance/Security: the slow-regex (ReDoS) rules in the CRS-derived set (crs-941160, the 9322xx command-injection family, 942190, 942230, 934200 and others) now run in linear time, with and without PCRE JIT. Worst-case CPU per request is bounded (about 2 s with JIT, 3.5 s without) including cookies and headers, which now have a size budget too.\n- Security: uploaded files are inspected by kind instead of as text. Images, PDFs, archives and office files are no longer blocked or banned by text rules; PHP code hidden in a media file, spoofed archives/executables and PHP-style or double extensions (including chunked uploads that name the destination file in a POST field) are still blocked. SVG uploads remain blocked on purpose.\n- Security: credentials that only look valid (forged Basic header or logged-in cookie) no longer open the REST \"verified author\" hold; application passwords are verified server-side before any exception applies.\n- Fix (multisite): network deactivation, per-site deactivation and uninstall now handle every site of the network and clean up all plugin data; deactivation stops enforcement.\n- Fix: the MFA browser-binding cookies work on sites with a login URL outside the home path, with visible redirects and clear failure notices.\n- Fix: forwarded headers from private addresses are never trusted automatically; a mod_remoteip diagnostic was added.\n- Privacy: GeoIP lookup is opt-in; the self-update check discloses what it sends.\n- Vulnerability baseline: the free baseline is now built from NVD data with provenance.",
"signature": "CAlXPYHH2oqn4XqbWygt7LgGFnKpkbcMCoDin6zKQeOh99WGDg6xT9wrKBDNceWiYGZOWqyau8UN4Ua2+3BxBA=="
"summary": "* Security: fixed three WAF rules that could be made to use excessive CPU time with a single crafted request (a denial-of-service risk on the site itself): the Windows batch-command rule, the XML external-entity rule and the path normaliser. Detection results are unchanged; only the time they take on hostile input is bounded",
"signature": "+K1GGe2DaYtJ25JKCoB7rg2gK35/VBqawhCuv3sY6BHjefwB0cSV78uZkgGO9yyqL7/1guua+se2mO8uMu0ACQ=="
}