tech
db132c9f92
Full review of what belongs in the public installer vs. what customers should never need to see, per an explicit audit request: - Removed DB_USER/DB_NAME as customer-configurable env vars entirely -- nothing outside this compose stack ever connects to Postgres directly, so there was no real reason a customer would ever change these. Hardcoded to postgres/argus in docker-compose.yml and the two scripts that referenced them (backup.sh, restore.sh); DB_PASSWORD remains the one real secret, still auto-generated by install.sh. - Removed ANIS_ADMIN_KEY entirely -- confirmed dead in a prior session's audit: it's ANIS's own admin-dashboard credential, unrelated to the ARGUS<->ANIS intelligence protocol, which ARGUS never sends. Carried over into this file by copy-paste from ANIS's own env template, not because ARGUS ever uses it. - Reordered/re-commented env.example around what a customer actually might touch (timezone, ANIS bootstrap trio, network ports for conflict resolution, DOCKER_API_VERSION for NAS platforms) versus what's fully automated (DB_PASSWORD) -- with an explicit note that ongoing product configuration (WAF, DNS, users, policies) happens in the dashboard, not this file. - ANIS_ENABLED/ANIS_URL defaults aligned with the Community Edition auto-provisioning decision (true / https://anis.weboria.eu) -- previously still showed the pre-decision false/empty defaults since this repo's initial population predated that change landing. - Flagged CHANGELOG.md as stale (last entry v3.29.0, well behind the current shipped version) with an honest note rather than silently leaving a misleading "GitHub Releases page" pointer or backfilling invented descriptions of past releases. No file needed to move to the private repo -- everything here (install/ update/backup/restore/healthcheck/uninstall scripts, the compose manifest, license/notice docs) is either required for the customer to install and operate ARGUS or a legal-transparency requirement. None of it is build logic, dev configuration, or reproducible source.
38 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes to ARGUS are documented here, in plain language for operators.
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Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
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## [3.29.0] — 2026-07-19
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### Security
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- Hardened the Challenge Engine's internal signing so a rare startup condition can no
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longer weaken bot-challenge verification.
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- Updated bundled build tooling to close several third-party dependency advisories.
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## [3.28.0] — 2026-07-19
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### Added
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- DNS Protection settings now include contextual help explaining what each detector and
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threshold does, so you can tune it with confidence instead of guessing.
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## [3.27.0] — 2026-07-19
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### Added
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- Complete user-management workflow: edit user details, admin-initiated password resets,
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MFA reset, account lock/unlock, session management, and login history — all from one
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panel per user.
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- Redesigned Attack Origin visualization: a single live global map (previously two separate,
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inconsistent views) showing real-time attack traffic with per-event detail on demand.
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## [3.26.0] and earlier
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Earlier release history predates this distribution's changelog.
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---
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**Note (2026-07-25):** this file is not currently kept in sync with every release — the most
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recent entry above predates the current shipped version. Updating this changelog needs to
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become part of the standard release process going forward, not backfilled retroactively with
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invented descriptions of past changes.
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