Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
001bbefa3f | ||
|
|
ef6555a1e4 | ||
|
|
8832cee2da | ||
|
|
0c3ac9e463 | ||
|
|
22b7a76a6e | ||
|
|
1544198d02 | ||
|
|
4b3e877127 | ||
|
|
8324647177 | ||
|
|
eec9b0e6f0 | ||
|
|
301e39dc66 | ||
|
|
aed69ceb6e | ||
|
|
82b525ca1e | ||
|
|
543bdd58d4 | ||
|
|
1ff0bdbeca | ||
|
|
09ac6a1fda | ||
|
|
2ce45b9c2d | ||
|
|
21ed592b8b | ||
|
|
cc56098488 | ||
|
|
8fa6153099 | ||
|
|
c8f8640e4c | ||
|
|
50336dfd90 | ||
|
|
85997bca02 | ||
|
|
3aa96c7b3e | ||
|
|
a8108f9b84 | ||
|
|
d89b0d09a9 | ||
|
|
fa1beeb71d |
+6
-6
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
|
|||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
"version": "7.58.0",
|
"version": "7.79.0",
|
||||||
"released_at": "2026-10-07T11:13:22+00:00",
|
"released_at": "2026-11-01T19:11:08+00:00",
|
||||||
"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v7.58.0/argus-wordpress-defence-7.58.0.zip",
|
"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v7.79.0/argus-wordpress-defence-7.79.0.zip",
|
||||||
"sha256": "b140d997084875edafa67a4762f3f7ec5662c17cbf9670a024b092351e950a90",
|
"sha256": "55bc91c11d0e0ff5a9ef63de3b3b052a9724d42540e1155624b4e53773f91380",
|
||||||
"min_php": "7.4",
|
"min_php": "7.4",
|
||||||
"min_wp": "6.0",
|
"min_wp": "6.0",
|
||||||
"critical": false,
|
"critical": false,
|
||||||
"summary": "* Findings for events ARGUS already handled automatically -- a brute-force IP ban, a bad-bot\n auto-block -- now consistently say so, instead of occasionally still showing \"Nothing\n automatically\" after the action already happened.\n* If an automatic ban ever fails to save, ARGUS now raises its own finding about that failure\n instead of quietly treating the event as resolved.\n* Vulnerability Protection now recognises ARGUS WordPress Defence itself as a trusted, first-party\n component, instead of showing it as an unverified external plugin just because it isn't\n distributed through WordPress.org. A real vulnerability in ARGUS's own code is still detected\n and flagged just the same.",
|
"summary": "* Protection against PHP2Shell and PHP remote file inclusion attacks strengthened: the firewall now inspects Content-Type request headers (used in some exploit delivery chains), detects PHP CLI option injection in request URIs, and catches two additional webshell obfuscation patterns (assert-with-decode and chr-concat-exec) during malware scanning.\n* Health check now surfaces dangerous PHP configuration settings (allow_url_include enabled, disable_functions empty) that amplify the damage from any successful PHP exploit, giving you a clear action to take before a problem occurs.",
|
||||||
"signature": "1DvPQAaVW591I8ZNfz4ZVl0xTsJOOzRy1NCcrl3k6vizqbsrG4kvJd3O5lDLD23Q5VsFrUlM5BT/vatxN7soDQ=="
|
"signature": "NImxOSmJi7KpXuMiFf+LLgrFGG+H9hDX5a8Y+s1f/weHynUzsIpkjvODL+5DWndg0w+zXx3+pcOSFACXZTOxAw=="
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user