Update signed manifest to 8.6.9
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{
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{
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"version": "8.6.8",
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"version": "8.6.9",
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"released_at": "2026-11-20T21:26:21+00:00",
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"released_at": "2026-11-20T22:51:30+00:00",
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"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v8.6.8/argus-wordpress-defence-8.6.8.zip",
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"package_url": "https://git-cloud.weboria.eu/Weboria/argus-wp-defence/releases/download/v8.6.9/argus-wordpress-defence-8.6.9.zip",
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"sha256": "4f0e0c89c316c8dcf0bd1dd0dee879f19e71258194add3c9bad81f37638c35e7",
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"sha256": "de235e8e7325436b6e4b4516d1d0b24bc9b674bd038a4d89f20888cd6ca785ba",
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"min_php": "7.4",
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"min_php": "7.4",
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"min_wp": "6.0",
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"min_wp": "6.0",
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"critical": false,
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"critical": false,
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"summary": "- Security: uploaded file content is now scanned by WAF PHP injection rules (crs-933xxx, phpi-*, eval-based rules), so webshells embedded inside files with benign names (e.g. \"image.jpg\") are detected even when a plugin moves the file directly without passing through the Upload Guard.\n- Security: removed User-Agent and Referer header exclusions from all custom WAF rules covering SQL injection, remote code execution, PHP injection, path traversal, XXE, and SSRF \u2014 these attack vectors are regularly delivered through request headers.\n- Security: WAF live-corpus scan window expanded to cover values up to 64 KB without a gap \u2014 previously values over 16 KB had an unscanned middle band that could be exploited by padding an attack payload with 16 KB of harmless content.\n- Security: the WAF no longer fails open. A value that cannot be fully evaluated within its CPU budget now raises a high-severity \"evasion\" signal and is blocked for untrusted users; verified authors with the unfiltered_html capability may still save large content. Padding, repeated units and oversized values can no longer be used to slip an attack past the rules.\n- Performance/Security: the slow-regex (ReDoS) rules in the CRS-derived set (crs-941160, the 9322xx command-injection family, 942190, 942230, 934200 and others) now run in linear time, with and without PCRE JIT. Worst-case CPU per request is bounded (about 2 s with JIT, 3.5 s without) including cookies and headers, which now have a size budget too.\n- Security: uploaded files are inspected by kind instead of as text. Images, PDFs, archives and office files are no longer blocked or banned by text rules; PHP code hidden in a media file, spoofed archives/executables and PHP-style or double extensions (including chunked uploads that name the destination file in a POST field) are still blocked. SVG uploads remain blocked on purpose.\n- Security: credentials that only look valid (forged Basic header or logged-in cookie) no longer open the REST \"verified author\" hold; application passwords are verified server-side before any exception applies.\n- Fix (multisite): network deactivation, per-site deactivation and uninstall now handle every site of the network and clean up all plugin data; deactivation stops enforcement.\n- Fix: the MFA browser-binding cookies work on sites with a login URL outside the home path, with visible redirects and clear failure notices.\n- Fix: forwarded headers from private addresses are never trusted automatically; a mod_remoteip diagnostic was added.\n- Privacy: GeoIP lookup is opt-in; the self-update check discloses what it sends.\n- Vulnerability baseline: the free baseline is now built from NVD data with provenance.",
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"summary": "- Fix: the server's own requests (a host cron fetching wp-cron.php with wget/curl, loopback and hairpin calls) are classified internal. The Bot Filter no longer challenges the WP-Cron loopback request, they are never shown on the threat map or counted as attacks, and their events carry ip_class=internal. The firewall still inspects their payloads.\n- Hardening: a public visitor cannot claim \"internal\" with a forged X-Forwarded-For header; forwarded headers from private peers remain untrusted. Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1) are never banned.\n= Unreleased =\n- Fix: a single legitimate request that tripped one firewall signature could earn a 24 h IP ban; all firewall bans now require corroboration.\n- Fix: posts and checkout notes containing SQL-like text or a semicolon are no longer matched by the stacked-statement rule; verified editors using the REST API are not blocked or banned for quoting code.\n- Fix: Facebook link-shim referrers and a literal \"<?php\" in the User-Agent/Referer are no longer blocked.\n- Fix: a rule exception could be used to hide an attack that repeated the excepted value.\n- Fix: forwarded headers from a private address are never trusted automatically; the Cloudflare auto-detection no longer calls a non-existent method.\n- New: \"1 OR 1=1\" style numeric tautologies are detected.\n- Clarified: the mode (Monitor by default) and what it does are shown in the admin header and Firewall page.",
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"signature": "CAlXPYHH2oqn4XqbWygt7LgGFnKpkbcMCoDin6zKQeOh99WGDg6xT9wrKBDNceWiYGZOWqyau8UN4Ua2+3BxBA=="
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"signature": "lmAhxd/yPOxu/3JWkZP2Kaz70+MMgwdf2cXBdI2lFb3GdZX+raOM4V+jORDj5D4ZJYW+di9W2CpFHJnSuKHVBw=="
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}
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}
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